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RECENT DECISIONS
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-APPARENT AuTHORrY-SALEs OF STOCK AND AGREE-
MENTS TO REPURCHASE.-The defendant corporation, through its agent, who was
duly authorized to sell stock, sold the plaintiffs, husband and wife aged 74 and
76 years respectively, 26 shares of preferred stock in the corporation at $100
a share. Each time the agent discussed the transaction with the plaintiffs he
agreed with them that the corporation would repurchase the stock at any time
the plaintiffs so desired, and their money would be returned in 10 days or two
weeks after the repurchase was requested, less $2 per share on all stock turned
in within one year and less $1 per share on all stock turned in within two
years. This agent brought plaintiffs a letter written on the corporation's letter-
head, addressed to the plaintiffs, and signed by the defendant corporation's
investment representative. This letter was to the effect that the defendant had
always maintained a market for its stock at the figures named by the agent and
expected to do so indefinitely. Plaintiffs purchased the stock and their $2600
payment was turned over to the defendant by the agent. Three years later the
plaintiffs tendered a return of all their stock to the defendant for repurchase
and the defendant refused on the ground that this repurchase agreement had
been made by their agent, and acknowledged by their investment representative,
without any authority from the defendant. Plaintiff, in need of funds, sold the
stock for $43 a share and brought action to recover the loss of $57 a share-
The trial court gave judgment for the full amount sued for. On appeal, held,
judgment affirmed; defendant's acceptance of the plaintiff's money was a suffi-
cient ratification of the agent's agreement to repurchase. Wright v. Iowa Power
& Light Co., (Iowa 1937) 274 N.W. 892.
For the purposes of this discussion the corporation shall be considered sol-
vent and not acting dtra vires. See 2 R.C.L. Supp. 405 & 431. The question
presented by the instant case is whether a corporation can, after accepting and
retaining the purchaser's money, repudiate a repurchase agreement made by
their agent having actual authority to sell the stock, but being unauthorized to,
enter into any agreement binding the corporation to repurchase. In Seifert v.
Union Brass & Metal Manufacturing Company, 191 Minn. 362, 254 N.W. 27S
(1934), the defendant corporation's president without authorization made
a written agreement that the corporation would repurchase any stock the plain-
tiff purchased and afterwards wished to resell, and the defendant accepted.
and retained the purchase money and subsequently refused to repurchase on the
ground that the president was unauthorized to make such agreement. The court,
deciding for the plaintiff, stated that since the agreement failed it was clear
there was no contract and to prevent the defendant's unjust enrichment the
plaintiff should recover the purchase price. There the court, unlike the court in
the instant case, turned away from the difficult question of the defendant's
liability under the unauthorized repurchase agreement, and by deciding that
there was no contract of purchase was able to reach what it felt was the
equitable decision by using the argument of unjust enrichment. In Grace Securi-
ties v. Roberts, 158 Va. 792, 164 S.E. 700 (1932), where the defendant corpora-
tion's vice-president entered into the repurchase agreement with the plaintiff
buyer, and two years after accepting the plaintiff's money the defendant refused
to repurchase, contending that such agreement was unauthorized, the court
decided for the plaintiff on the ground that while the vice-president had no,
formal authority from the defendant, his agreement was known to the individual
directors of the corporation and the defendant would not be allowed to repudi-
ate such agreement on the ground that this agent was unauthorized. In a case
where the facts are directly comparable to those of the instant case, Murray v.
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Standard Pecan Co., 309 Ill. 226, 140 N.E. 834 (1923), the court, reversing a
judgment for the plaintiff purchaser, founded its reasoning upon the argument
that the agent, making the repurchase agreement, was only a special agent hav-
ing power to sell the stock, but was unauthorized to do more, and so far as the
principal was concerned the sale was not conditional, and the court felt that
retaining the purchase money was not a ratification of the agent's unauthorized
agreement.
In comparing these three cases with the instant case it becomes evident that
each case is characterized not only by its facts but by the reasoning used by
the courts in each to reach what they feel is the equitable decision. The courts
which found for the plaintiff purchaser seemingly were influenced by facts
which were not "legally" important to the problem at hand. In the instant case
the advanced age of the plaintiff's was a motivating factor in the court's decision,
and in the two cases in which the repurchase agreement was made with the
plaintiff by important officers of the defendant corporation the court took this
point into consideration and decided that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
what he had paid for stock in the defendant corporation. The "argumentative
tools" used by the courts in all of the cases are varied, and this variance in the
use of these tools, such as "special agent," "unjust enrichment," and "ratification,"
brings forth the point that the courts will decide where the equities lie and will
then bolster the decision through the use of the "standardized" legal terminology.
It should be noted that in the case where the court reached its decision through
the strictest adherence to the usual legal arguments the resulting decision is in
the minority.
JosEpi GOLDnERG AND JOHN H. RussELL.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS-LABILITY OP SuRETY.-
This action is by a subcontractor upon a statutory bond intended to affard pro-
tection to materialmen and laborers who furnished materials or performed labor
in the construction of a public building. The plaintiff sued the surety on the
bond, the contractor, and its receiver to recover for services performed on
school "No. 69." He had also done work for the same contractor on school
"No. 49." The bond for that job was underwritten by another surety. It was
contended by the defendant that the plaintiff had received money in payment
for the work done on school "No. 69," and had wrongfully applied the money
so received upon the payment of the prior account. The trial court entered a
judgment on the verdict in the amount of $1,692.33 which was the amount
determined to be still due and owing upon job "No. 69." On appeal, held, judg-
ment affirmed. In the event of failure by debtor to designate, the creditor has the
right to apply payments received to whatever debt he may choose. The finding
of the jury that no direction was made by the debtor, is binding in absence
of evidence grossly to the contrary. Western & Southern Indemnity Co. v.
Cramer, (Ind. 1937) 10 N.E. (2d) 440.
The general rule is that where a debtor owes distinct accounts or debts and
makes a voluntary payment of money, he may direct its application. Upon his
failure to so designate the creditor may, and in the absence of either party to so
designate, the law will apply it justly, usually in extinguishment of the first
debt. Born v. Union Elevator Co., 67 Ind. App. 97, 118 N.E. 973 (1918); Stone
v. Talbot, 4 Wis. 422 (1855) ; Milwaukee Boston Store v. Katz, 153 Wis. 492,
140 N.W. 1038 (1913). Unless an agreement exists to the contrary payments in
absence of designation must be applied to extinguishment of the indebtedness
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